



Citizen-Centered Approaches
to State and Market



Kosovo: Developing a Strategy for the Future

2007

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I. Introduction

Kosovo is passing through a critical period of its post-bellum existence.¹ Kosovo has a destination-Europe- which gives it a clear picture of a desirable future. Both by geography and choice it is European. Yet neither the UNMIK administration nor the PISG have yet carved a practical route towards this destination. Legally, Kosovo is in a state of suspended animation, as it is neither an independent state nor yet advanced on its Accession process to Europe. There is a consensus that the status quo is untenable, as the present cannot be perpetuated indefinitely. The overwhelming focus on the question of status, however, has prevented both Kosovar and non-Kosovar actors acquiring an understanding of the assets and constraints that would allow Kosovars to create a multi-functional state. Resolution of status is critical to momentum towards a desirable future.

Further to a meeting at Pocantico in April 2007 with the Kosovo Unity Team, civil society representatives and some of Kosovo's international partners, the ISE team was invited by the Unity Team to Kosovo to undertake a stock-taking of its current situation. Drawing on documentation of previous processes and analysis, we talked to a wide range of stakeholders using our process of "critical stakeholder inquiry", and reviewed the functioning of institutions in Kosovo. Subsequently, we were invited to provide briefings to the President, Prime Minister, Cabinet, members of the Unity Team and international partners in Kosovo, and then briefings in Brussels, London, New York and Washington D.C. to interested policy-makers. The objective of this report is to provide Kosovo decision-makers and their international partners with a summary of our findings, a balance sheet of their assets and constraints, identification of levers of change, and recommendations for moving forward.

II. Executive Summary

Kosovo has taken positive steps since the end of the conflict in 1999. The Kosovar people are well placed to deal with the challenges they face- strong social networks underpin an informal social protection system and a nascent economy; an incipient civil society is beginning to grow and understand policy decision-making; the foundations of accountability within public finance functions have been established through accurate revenue forecasting mechanisms, improved customs revenue collection, audit reporting and a functioning banking system; and there are a number of latent assets such as location, a young population, international goodwill and natural resources that can be mobilized to support economic growth.

However, a number of political, economic and social challenges remain, that must be confronted. In 1999, Kosovars cohered as a people to survive collectively, and put trust in their leaders. The perceived failure of government and its international partners to provide a better standard of living and clear path to a different future is creating problems of trust. There remains a disconnect between popular needs and

¹ Following the NATO air strikes that began in March 1999 and Slobodan Milosevic's subsequent capitulation, Kosovo became a UN protectorate under the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). Kosovo now faces a decision in the Security Council on a path to eventual independence, with EU stewardship as the intermediate mechanism.

official solutions and there has been little consideration of the interrelationship between short, medium and long-term issues, and credible implementation mechanisms for a state-building strategy that ends up in Europe are yet to be delineated. A lack of investment in human capabilities is undermining Kosovo's ability to fulfill government and market functions effectively, while an accurate costing framework is not in place to truly allow for a functioning state to develop if independence is the ultimate outcome of current negotiations. Through KFOR, the international community has provided a relatively secure environment in Kosovo. However, questions regarding the management and efficiency of the international presence have undermined the credibility of international organizations, while dependence on technical assistance modalities has perpetuated parallel decision-making and delivery mechanisms without building the necessary local capacity.

Kosovo's partners have a variety of assets that could support the development of a functioning polity, market and society, but these tools are under-utilized. Moving forward, if Europe is the goal for Kosovo, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) and its partners must carry out a process of backward mapping from that goal, mobilize donor and partner assets more effectively and synergize domestic capabilities. In the medium-term, this involves completing accountability within institutions, reforming technical assistance modalities, improving coordination among donors, starting to bring coherence to rules and law, developing a concrete and coherent program for human development, and creating public works programs at the village level. In the longer-term, Kosovo must mobilize resources and capabilities more efficiently, build the institutions of law-making and law enforcement and redouble its efforts to build social cohesion.

Kosovo is moving simultaneously from its status as a protectorate to that of a state and of shared sovereignty within Europe. This process must be synchronized, strategically sequenced and supported by institutions that are carefully aligned and based on the requisite human capacity. ISE recommends that the PISG and partners in Kosovo now make a concerted effort to move from improvisation to choreography, realistically assess the opportunities and risks that face the Kosovar people, and work together with the nascent International Civilian Office (ICO) and donors to catalyze this double transformation. A first step in this process will be co-production of a partners' conference after a status decision, during which Kosovo must indicate to the broader international community that it is ready and able to take on the responsibilities and duties of statehood.

III. The Current Context

Kosovo remains in a disequilibrium. Both Kosovo and the international community recognize that the governing arrangements under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) cannot continue indefinitely. The Ahtisaari plan, sanctioned by the UN Secretary-General provides a framework to define Kosovo's internal settlement and minority-protection mechanisms, mandate a new international presence under the auspices of the European Union, and allow for supervised independence. This plan is the best basis upon which to move forward with the status question in Kosovo.

Both the Kosovar people and the international community need closure on this issue. Resolution of status is critical to progress in Kosovo for a number of reasons. Firstly, the current state of suspended animation perpetuates and exacerbates ethnic issues in Kosovo, which in turn contribute to social and economic difficulties. Without certainty as to their futures, many Kosovo Serbs and Albanians are not making the effort necessary to integrate or live together in mixed communities and are not willing to make the investments or develop the shared social capital that could support a functional economy and society. This is particularly the case north of the Ibar river, contiguous to Serbia proper, where Serbian communities threaten to secede from Kosovo if the province is given independence. From the economic perspective the current temporization creates constraints such as the inability of Kosovo to attract much-needed foreign direct investment, reflected in everyday life through more mundane problems such as the fact that Serb products cannot be taxed by the PISG or the fact that Kosovo must pay Serbia and Montenegro for use of telephone codes.

Secondly, lack of status definition and the perpetuation of UNMIK confuses and diffuses decision-making processes, blurs mechanisms of accountability and transparency and undermines decision-making. Without a government that Kosovars can understand as the arbiter of both their rights and obligations as citizens of a coherent political entity, Kosovo will continue to suffer from mismanagement and bureaucratic inefficiencies. The strong desire among the Kosovar Albanian population for independence leads to censorship of demands for accountability and transparency, which further perpetuates this problem. But UNMIK has no detailed strategy for the handover of responsibilities to Kosovo and the requisite EU institutions and no definitive exit plan has yet been published.

Thirdly, delay of the status decision has created entrenched interests that grow around it- from the perpetuation of inefficient aid practices to organized criminal networks. Power does not tolerate a vacuum, and where there is an absence of well-structured and functional apparatus of the state, this vacuum is filled by organizations, well-meaning or otherwise, that can undermine stability and prosperity. Finally, the status-quo prevents long-term planning for the future, given that this future seems to be indistinct and ill-defined. This confuses policy-making and affects everything from legal reform, to capacity building, to energy sector development. It also negates any sense of citizenship- a Serb in Northern Mitrovica, for example, has no idea whether he or she will wake up the following day in Serbia, in an internationally administered Kosovo, or an independent state. Young Kosovars do not know what type of society they are supposed to be preparing themselves for, and this undermines any sense of obligation to that society.

Analysis by external actors does not seem to account to a large enough degree for these issues and the feelings of uncertainty that they produce in Kosovo. Kosovars, both Albanian and Serbian, are disappointed with the lack of progress in the past nine years and with the problems they still have to face on a daily basis. Donor documents mention these issues and provide cursory analysis of their geneses and effects, but then adopt approaches to Kosovo which do not reflect the distinctive nature of the context with which they are dealing. The voice of the Kosovar people, which is clamoring for positive reform and constructive change, cannot be heard. Despite the sense of uncertainty that overshadows political and economic life in Kosovo, its destination is actually very clear- Europe. Kosovo is European both by geography and by choice and therefore the question should not be ‘what’ the transition should be, but rather ‘how’ this transition should be carried out. This requires a process of backward mapping, through which this goal is used as the starting point for the identification of key assets and constraints, and the subsequent extrapolation of the changes and processes necessary to maximize positive movement and minimize blockages to achievement of this goal.

IV. Kosovo’s Assets

Progress will only be possible in Kosovo when the government and its international partners conduct a serious assessment of accomplishments and setbacks to date and use this as the basis for charting a way forward. The PISG needs to identify Kosovo’s key assets and delineate policy drivers and options that synergize and build upon these assets. Close analysis indicates that there are a number of assets- social, institutional, geographical, demographic, political and natural- that Kosovo can leverage for moving forward:

i) Strong social networks

Kosovo has the benefit of strong social networks. These networks underpin societal relationships and dynamics, and act as a mechanism for social support in lieu of a comprehensive welfare approach. Poverty numbers and living conditions in Kosovo simply do not match- statistically 37% of the population live in poverty, and 15% in extreme poverty, but in practice, networks among and between families and social groups support those that cannot support themselves. Remittances from the large Kosovar diaspora in Europe have helped to create a housing stock of southern European standards, a significant achievement given the devastation and destruction during the war of 1999. Home ownership is

now a reality for many Kosovars and the building that has taken place will allow for the absorption of future business and investment in Kosovo without causing the inflation in the housing system that is typical in many other post-conflict contexts. Equally, these networks have supported the emergence of a well-developed service industry which has capitalized on the continued presence of the international community and the regular visits by the diaspora. Additionally, investments in domestic entrepreneurial activities- wine producers are regionally competitive, domestic furniture production is expanding, and agricultural investment is looking for outlets- are beginning to show results.

There is little doubt that significant amounts of money circulate in Kosovo. The high level of consumer goods and the fact that the territory has the highest number of petrol pumps per capita in Europe attest to this fact. Part of the reason that so much of this money has financed fixed capital expenditures is because there is a dearth of other financial mechanisms into which it could be directed (discussed further below). Nevertheless, the social networks that underpin and mobilize this capital provide the basis for stability and economic development. If these networks were built upon and their energies channeled productively, they could help to bind Kosovar society and economy together.

ii) *Incipient civil society*

Civil society is also taking root in Kosovo, and can play an important role in monitoring government behavior and influencing the political and policy debates. Civil society groups have created a space of personal autonomy in Kosovo, have acquired a voice, and have an agenda-setting role on issues across the spectrum from security, to human rights, to the European agenda. Fundraising efforts have also been successful and civil society has now acquired the finances necessary to allow it to function. While broadly the media tends to be associated with certain interests and there is a degree of self-censorship, radio and television programming is expanding and the print media is relatively diverse. These changes are led by a group of young people both within and outside government that are now playing an active part in the development of Kosovar civil society. These leaders are frustrated with the problems that continue to afflict Kosovo, are not beholden to political interests, and have the energy, ideas and forward-thinking mentality to alter the social, political and economic dynamics throughout the territory. This group is bolstered by the nascent civil and business associations in Kosovo that have begun a process of discussion and collaboration. While these groups do not yet have the weight or capacity to affect lasting policy change- there is no real coordination at the industry level among businesses, and firms are still operating as small, family based organizations for example- they do provide a mechanism through which likeminded Kosovars can begin to address their problems and think through collective solutions. Civil society requires both an agenda and a forum to be able to articulate its several and common interests.


iii) *Foundations of accountability*

The PISG has made significant progress in terms of laying the foundations of accountability in public financial management processes. Reform of customs and revenue collection over the past seven years has led to a five-fold increase in government revenues; the government now has accurate revenue forecasting mechanisms, which predict more than €400 million in cash reserves at the end of this year contrary to donor forecasts that anticipated a major deficit in government accounts; a fully-functioning banking sector is in operation, overseen by an independent Central Bank; government finances are channelled through an integrated Single Treasury Account and payment of civil servant wages is automated and routinized; and audit reporting processes are in place. These accomplishments have helped Kosovo to move from a cash-based economy and government in 1999 to a credit economy today. Roughly 60% of expenditure is now on budget and control systems are in place for budget support from donors to take place. These reforms are substantial and if consolidated, provide the basis for robust financial management processes in the future.

iv) *Latent assets*

Kosovo has considerable latent assets which must be mobilized and factored into long-term planning. These include its location in central Europe and close to the European Union, which can be leveraged through efforts to develop trade, tourism and regional business links. While its domestic market is small, as a pivotal trade route between the Aegean and the Adriatic seas, with the development of informal and formal business links with its neighbors, and with relatively low transportation costs to Western Europe, it can utilize its location to great effect. It has close ethnic, linguistic and geographical links with Albania and has access to Albanian ports; Kosovars have traditional trading relationships with Montenegro; there are a high number of Albanians in Macedonia with which to develop business relationships; and nearby Slovenia, which is fast developing itself as a technological bridge from the Balkans to Europe, has begun to invest in Kosovo. This regional context must be considered during the formulation of policy options. In terms of natural capital, the mining and energy sectors are also key potential sources of future growth. Kosovo has abundant reserves of lignite, lead, zinc, ferronickel, magnesite, and crushed stone. A temperate climate and fertile land would also support the development of market-based agriculture if the correct mechanisms, supply-chains and infrastructure can be put in place to support planning and development.

Kosovo benefits from an optimistic young people who are filled with a desire for change and for an opportunity to better their lives. Over 70% of Kosovo's population is under thirty years old, and this generation understands that Kosovo's future is in Europe (indeed this demographic is highly attractive for investors, unlike much of Western Europe). With the appropriate opportunities and training, this generation could drive the engine of economic and



political development, particularly if supplemented by the return of many of the 500,000 Kosovars that are now based in Europe generating wealth and building skills. Finally, all of these latent assets are supplemented by the international goodwill that Kosovo receives in both Europe and the United States. Based partly on historical events, Kosovar decision-makers have access to senior policymakers and friends at all levels of government on both sides of the Atlantic to an unusual extent for such a small territory, which can be mobilized for both implicit and explicit support of Kosovar goals.

V. Kosovo's Constraints

While a variety of assets exist in Kosovo, there are also some serious institutional, legal, human and societal constraints. While the status issue to some degree underpins aspects of these problems, it is used continuously both by Kosovar politicians and by the people of Kosovo themselves as an excuse for lack of positive reform.³ Focus on politics has come at the expense of investment in the economy and society, and the net result is endless political machinations without concrete policy prescriptions and a distinct

³ For example, one mayor indicated to ISE that people in his municipality do not seem to care about the high levels of unemployment- they argue that once status is resolved they can think about their other problems, without recognition of the fact that status will not directly create jobs.

lack of trust in government by Kosovar Serbs and Albanians alike. Good governance, prosperity and stability in Kosovo are undermined by the following factors:

i) Weak social cohesion

While social networks are strong in Kosovo, social cohesion is weak. Serbian and Albanian communities are largely unconnected- they live in different villages, they make little or no effort to learn each others' languages, and their children are schooled separately- and the longer these trends persists the more entrenched perceptions and realities become. While payment to officials, including teachers, in Serbian communities continues from Belgrade, it limits their autonomy for decision-making. This undermines the social networks which are underpinning Kosovar society, propagates corruption and perpetuates the political status-quo.

Social cohesion is particularly weak between northern and southern Kosovo. In northern Mitrovica, Serbian decision-making is community-based to a larger degree, but problems of daily life are a key source of concern. Clean water, electricity, health services, jobs, human security, construction of the housing stock, and reintegration of displaced people remain central problems. There are few ways for Serbs to improve their lives and little room for them to come together and discuss problems or the way forward. Serbs in northern Mitrovica feel that status has been a moving target and as a result do not feel that the decision-making governing their lives has been based on objective criteria that they can understand and monitor. If the authorities delivered on certain promises this would build credibility and trust, but this process is absent. There is a palpable sense that there has been a triple failure- of the international community, Serbian leadership, and the PISG- to provide Kosovar Serbs with opportunity or hope. The outcome of these problems is that there is little conception of shared future or interaction between the Serbian and Albanian populations.

ii) Rule of law

Demand for law is high in Kosovo- the spontaneous mobilization of Kosovars in protest to the killing of a policeman in September this year is just one example that attests to this fact- but supply is low. Organized crime networks, money laundering, human rights and human and narco-trafficking issues persist. Although not anomalous in the region in this sense, the legal vacuum in Kosovo for fighting organized crime, and the weakness of extradition procedures in particular, is giving a safe-haven to criminal gangs. A special office of the prosecutor has been set up to deal with organized crime issues, but this is somewhat stillborn without the equivalent office on the procedural side. Equally, there is a great deal of attention to money-laundering, but there is inadequate legislation to deal with money-laundering cases. The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has taken over all regular duties from UNMIK police and responsibility for all municipal stations and regional headquarters except Mitrovica, but problems remain- working conditions for the KPS need improvement and it still suffers from a certain degree of mistrust as a result of Serbian police repression in the 1990s.

On the procedural side, Kosovo operates with four different legal systems in place. There is no central database of laws in effect, no mechanism for resolution of conflict among laws, and no process for the binding interpretation of the law or clarity on the precedence of language in law. As a result, some old laws need to be modified, others entirely replaced, and sub-laws harmonized, but the capability does not exist to compose harmonized legislation across the Albanian, Serb and English languages. There has been little investment in the necessary training to create a cadre of qualified judges and prosecutors, an issue of particular concern given that the older generation is now retiring. As a result, while a series of laws have been promulgated under UNMIK, they have not been applied uniformly across Kosovo's territory. Moreover, judicial credibility is continually undermined by the heavy backlog of cases which are being received faster than they can be adjudicated, and the continuation of parallel legal and rule of law enforcement structures in Serb enclaves, supported by Belgrade. All of these problems are compounded

by the unaccountability of the international community. UNMIK is not subject to the law and cannot be prosecuted under it, and KFOR falls outside the Ombudsperson's jurisdiction. UNMIK assigns such power to administrative directives that these directives are implemented as if they have the status of law, adding to legal confusion. It is therefore very difficult for the people of Kosovo to perceive the legality or illegality of any given action or to have any trust in the predictability of the legal system.

iii) *Governance*

While Kosovo has made impressive public financial management reforms, serious governance issues persist. The accomplishments made in terms of accountability are fragile- the majority of these reforms have been carried out by a small number of honest and talented individuals within various government ministries, but many of these are not paid through the government budget, but rather on special salaries hired by various projects. Even when paid through the budget, civil servant salaries are extremely low when compared to the wages paid by international organizations. As a result, turnover is high and the number of committed and reform-minded Kosovar bureaucrats is still low. Indeed, the turnover in certain government functions is as high as 30%, which prevents capacity building and hinders long-term planning.⁴ This problem will only get worse as the conditions and prospects for educated young people in Kosovo fail to improve.

A technical space of governance has still not been created in which the functions of government can be agreed upon or carried out. There is a danger that many key positions which presently act as nodes for transparent and accountable behavior due to international oversight or otherwise, may become politicized post-status. The Director-General of the Treasury, for example, is a highly capable bureaucrat, but his position is shielded from political influence by UNMIK-promulgated legislation and there is no guarantee that this will remain the case when UNMIK transitions into the ICO. Government procurement systems remain weak and the thousands of separate small projects with which they have to deal provide wide scope for corruption and mismanagement, eroding trust. Budget organizations have little capacity and are too broad, and a revised, robust budget law will be necessary post status to avoid politicization of the process. Accounting processes need coordination across government ministries, and the dating of expenditures within the treasury needs to be improved. While customs revenue is greater than expenditure, corruption still pervades the customs function, demonstrated anecdotally by the fact that 6,000 people apply for every customs job. Other government and private sector jobs that have higher wages receive only 200 applications per post.

On a political level, the Assembly rarely meets, and its debates fail to stimulate serious consideration of the problems that affect Kosovo aside from the issue of status. Thus, the PISG derives its legitimacy from the international community rather than the population- Kosovar Albanians support this arrangement only in view of the independence that it is expected to deliver. Thus, checks and balances on the executive do not exist as there remains a dearth of legitimate and constructive political participation by the Kosovar population. This increases frustration which often has negative manifestations.⁵ There is also significant stakeholder dissatisfaction with municipal governments, which are viewed by the majority of Kosovars as corrupt, inefficient, or both. All of these problems are further complicated by the unclear lines of accountability between the PISG and UNMIK, given the executive powers inherent in UNMIK's mandate which inhibit a clear division of responsibilities.

⁴ Five years ago the budget department had five consultants funded to work within it. None of these consultants now work in the department.

⁵ In 2004, UNDP found that in Kosovo there is four times as much destructive civic participation, such as protests, as there is positive civic participation such as implementation of an NGO project. UNDP Kosovo, 2004. *Human Development Report Kosovo, 2004. The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and Choices*. Pristina: UNDP Kosovo

iv) *Failure to create a functioning market*

Kosovo has dismantled the old socialist economy but has not created a new economy based on a functioning market that can produce the jobs and growth necessary to support development. Small businesses such as restaurants and gas stations are seen as the quickest route to profit because there are no longer term investments or financial mechanisms such as venture capital funds to bring small individual savings together.⁶ Significant funds are put towards housing construction, and while this housing stock may be useful in the longer-term, much of the building is illegal or construction is only partially finished due to insufficient funds. Credit is expensive (18% interest in some areas), an issue again underpinned by the absence of the rule of law- as there is no guarantee that loans will be paid back. Along with the absence of structured financial instruments, this prevents Kosovars from converting their money into productive capital which could then be circulated in profit-making activities. There is no credible macro-level investment plan or constructive, two-way dialogue between the government and businesses as to how to create the necessary environment for economic growth and commercial development. The perceived mishandling of the privatization process for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has further eroded trust in government on economic issues.

The private sector in Kosovo remains largely an abstraction, and has not been configured in a way that can bring assets and finances together in a coherent manner and expand the zone of legitimate economic opportunity. While it is relatively easy to establish a business in Kosovo, and Pristina has free trade agreements with various countries in the Balkans, a liberal trading regime more broadly, and full access to the EU market, there is no regional marketing strategy to take advantage of these agreements. Kosovo has not yet maximized use of its brand. Beyond this, there has been little support from local level governments within Kosovo to increase regional investment or encourage the development of local industries and services. A 'visible hand' has not created the market to generate reinforcing entrepreneurial loops. As a result the young, productive members of society seek opportunity elsewhere- particularly in Europe. Thus the economy in Kosovo is not constituted in Kosovo per se, but is constituted by Kosovars. That is to say that economic activity is based upon relationships and remittances. For most Kosovars, the diaspora is the only source of large or even medium-scale finance.

There has also been no conceptualization of a networked economy to bring together skills, productive activities and finances. The absence of functioning infrastructure and power prevents the production and transportation of goods to market and the delivery of effective services. Infrastructure planning and capital expenditure are not conceived of in relation to commercial patterns or loci of activity. Local capacity has not been built, and procurement has not yet become a tool for the development of the local private sector. In the contracting industry, for example, Kosovars have not made efforts to catalyze leasing operations for heavy machinery or manage small projects and operational maintenance of larger projects. Understanding of value chain issues is also weak among businesses, and technical capabilities are low. At the firm and industry level, there is an absence of a stable enabling environment and an under utilization of capacity, scaling up is a problem and technology is not supported by infrastructure. This prevents coordination and hinders investment- indeed, none of the municipalities we visited could name any productive or large-scale private sector investments in their communities.


v) *Lack of investment in capabilities*

As yet, Kosovo has no coherent, medium-term human development strategy to create the skills it needs for a functional government and economy. It does not have a well-planned series of programs to train the technical staff able to carry out government work and the managers able to run a functioning private sector. The government and donors have not seriously thought through how education relates to a functioning state. There is a 40% drop-out rate from secondary schools, and a consensus among students

⁶ It is highly likely that these investments also provide ideal fronts for money laundering given the absence of coherent rule of law in Kosovo which prevents investigation and prosecution of any such activity.

that do reach university on the poor quality and lack of availability of higher and vocational education. As described above, young people are one of the biggest resources in Kosovo, but there is no systematic approach to developing their skills, or making best use of those who study abroad and return to Kosovo with specific skill sets. Moreover, the current aspirations of students in Kosovo reflect the deep dependency from which it suffers. Many of the students we spoke to mentioned their desire to develop their English and computer skills so as to work for the international community and NGOs, as these organizations provide the highest salaries.⁷ These skills simply will not create a real economy in Kosovo in the long-term.

Unemployment is pervasive and growing, and thus competition is high for jobs. In the private sector graduates do not have the skills to generate a truly competitive economy, and in the public sector, competition leads to patronage. Huge investments by donors in technical assistance have made some reform possible in the public sector, but this has only substituted for local capacity which has failed to develop as a result. The self-perpetuating technical assistance dynamic must change so as to be demand rather than supply driven, as discussed further below. Kosovo



has not put the systems in place to develop leadership and management skills or to bring existing talents together in a productive fashion. Many Kosovar individuals are highly impressive on an individual basis, but collectively their skills are not being fully mobilized.

VI. International Stakeholder Assessment

Any discussion of Kosovo’s assets and constraints necessitates evaluation of donor activity, given that international engagement has been both significant and consistent over the past nine years:

i) Mixed record on donor administration and assistance

The overwhelming success for the international community in Kosovo has been the provision of security by KFOR. Crime exists on an individualized basis and ethnic tensions occasionally flair into violence, but structurally this violence is very different to that found in most post-conflict environments after an inter-ethnic struggle. Broadly speaking KFOR has maintained security, and Kosovars rank international troops highly in terms of trust and professionalism.

However, the record on donor administration and assistance is more mixed. While UNMIK has played a positive role overall in stabilizing Kosovo in the transition from conflict to post-conflict, its continued presence has confused lines of accountability, undermined the development of domestic capability for rule of law, and delayed the emergence of Kosovar institutions and processes of governance. The

⁷ When pressed further as to exactly the type of work they would like to do, the majority of students we listened to only mentioned entry level positions rather than managerial positions- again a result of the culture of dependency that has developed in Kosovo.

perceived corruption and mismanagement of the organization has also undermined its moral authority.⁸ International executive powers have allowed Kosovo's politicians to shirk responsibility for their errors, and use the international community as a scapegoat for Kosovo's ills. The emergency phase after the war was prolonged, which created a culture of dependency perpetuated by the international administration. The UN administration has not developed a meaningful exit strategy from Kosovo which has stunted long-term planning.

There has been an absence of coordination within and between UNMIK and other aid organizations and agencies and parallel initiatives have resulted in duplication of efforts. There are an estimated 45 agencies and 4000 NGOs in Kosovo, many of which work on a projectized basis, leading to irrational outcomes. Individual donor efforts could to some degree be justified if they produced results, but even in critical infrastructure reconstruction, progress has been patchy. In Drenica, for example, 90% of houses were destroyed during the war, and today only 60% have been rebuilt. This inability to create a stock of credibility with the Kosovar population and demonstrate visible results has undermined trust in the international community. The modality of aid delivery has also prevented longer-term development in Kosovo. More than 80 cents of every \$1 of aid Kosovo receives is delivered as technical assistance, but this has not produced lasting capacity within government institutions. Indeed, it is not clear that each consultant in place as technical assistance has clear reporting obligations to a Kosovar counterpart, time-bound and measurable deliverables, or incentives to hand over skills and knowledge to a counterpart within a time period. Instead, there were many examples cited of external advisors pursuing their own agendas without consulting their domestic counterparts. There has still been no systematic assessment of the sustainable results that this reliance on TA has produced. Other off-budget aid financing supports hundreds of small projects and initiatives that have led to perceived mismanagement and corruption.


Donors have also demonstrated a lack of coherent analysis of the situation in Kosovo. In some key sectors, feasibility studies have simply not been carried out, in others these studies exist but have not been brought together to develop sector or territory-wide strategies. Donor planning documents are incoherent as a result of multiple inputs; provide little focus on some key cross-cutting issues such as the environment, poverty reduction, the rule of law, and civil rights; demonstrate no inter-sectoral governance arrangements; and do not include financing provisions for issues such as minority rights and cultural protection measures for Serbs. There is a gap between planning processes and realities and no consensus on how to prioritize for the future, which has led to the misallocation of resources.

From a European perspective, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) mechanism is to guide Kosovo towards Europe, supplemented by the provision of aid, but in Kosovo these two processes have become delinked from each other. The Directorate General Enlargement team has responsibility for Kosovo, not the development team, and has the opportunity to provide a coherent review of lessons learnt from other accession countries or explained how these can be applied to Kosovo. Assistance has been at the technical level and not necessarily geared towards Europe per se. If Europe is truly Kosovo's agreed goal, then all aid and advice provided to the government must be based on this underlying provision. The European Union is exceptionally good at setting rules and providing the framework within which countries can aspire to join the union, but Kosovo provides unique challenges.

⁸ Serbs in northern Mitrovica, for example indicated their contempt for UNMIK after the arrest of the head of the financial police for corruption.

ii) *International partner assets*

The problems outlined above have led to mutual blame among donors but must now become the impetus for mutual rethinking of aid delivery. One means through which to generate positive forward momentum in this regard is for donors and the PISG to understand and assess the other assistance mechanisms that are available to Kosovo. There is a plethora of different modalities through which the government could interact with donor countries and which can provide a sustainable basis for economic growth in the longer-term.



Financial instruments include leasing operations to allow the domestic construction industry to develop, and investment guarantees, political risk insurance or venture capital funds to translate money into capital and attract regional and international investment. Donors could back these instruments in Kosovo through a joint public-private competitiveness study to identify key constraints that are preventing further investment in key sectors such as energy and agriculture. Donors can also provide special trade concessions and privileged access to markets, or facilitate regional trade access and assist the Kosovar government in identifying trade synergies. A reconceptualization of international engagement in Kosovo along these lines would create the basis for the economy to function effectively over the longer-term and move away from dependence on aid.

iii) *A costing framework*

Donors and the government have also underestimated the costs of status resolution, which will likely be far higher than predicted in the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). This is partly due to the fact that to date, the focus of consideration of status costs has been on the executive branch and not all three branches of government. The first step in a process to rectify this is to use the Ahtisaari plan as the basis for a full costing of status and the reforms necessary for Kosovo to join the European Union. The plan has short- and medium-term financial implications but these are minimal in comparison to the long-term budgetary issues it presents. Kosovo's cash budgeting prevents a broad planning horizon and meaningful commitment to the full integration of minorities will require substantial expenditure on infrastructure and decentralization over an extended period.

Therefore, donors should provide the PISG with the expertise to cost both medium-term and long-term reform and development programs in Kosovo in an objective manner, assist with cost contingencies and outline insurance mechanisms if cost estimates prove inaccurate. This will allow the government to better understand the cost of change, develop long-term planning mechanisms and map out what further donor assistance might be necessary. Some countries have developed a law that obliges the Treasury to cost political policies at the state and national level, and donors could seek to leverage these skills and apply them to the Kosovar context.

VII. Medium-Term Critical Tasks

Backward mapping from the European goal requires that all instruments and inputs provided by donors and used by the government are subordinated to the larger aim of European integration. However, advice

has been contradictory, especially in the legal domain; there has been little discussion about what Europe truly means; and the hard choices that need to be made if Kosovo wants to be European have not been discussed. In the medium-term, Kosovo must stitch domestic and partner assets together to synergize disconnected capabilities and work towards the European goal through carrying out the following critical tasks:

i) Completing accountability within institutions

The PISG must build on governance and accountability successes through, inter alia:

- Committing to make system audits carried out by the Office of the Auditor General available to parliament for review, establishing a public accounts committee, and working to increase the capacity of parliament to take action based on these reports;
- Finalizing reform of procurement rules and ensuring implementation of these rules;
- Partnering with donors to carry out a review of current accounting practices and reaching agreement on systemic and pragmatic measures for reform, including agreement on accounting standards at both the central and municipal levels; and
- Working to build capacity and organization within budget organizations for planning within the three-year budget framework to allow for longer-term priority setting and more consistent funding stream to ministries.

The PISG must also draw on the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment and the valuable analysis provided by donors on fiduciary strengths and weaknesses. This could begin with completion of the functional review of government, which can act as a basis for eliminating duplication and waste in government processes and organizations. Government restructuring has clear criteria with the Aquis Communautaire and it is imperative that Kosovo receives advice from donors that is consistent with the goal of alignment with Europe. Donors can also help the government to develop a plan to prevent the politicization of offices post-status, particularly within the treasury and central bank.

ii) Reforming technical assistance

The self-perpetuating TA processes in place in Kosovo must now move from a supply to a demand driven basis. Given the critical importance of Kosovo's energy sector, funding for TA might finance the following to produce lasting results:

- The geological survey could be released to the public;
- A coherent energy strategy that utilizes Kosovo's considerable resources, allows for clear decision-making on energy sector reform, and enables the government to meet EU standards;
- The development of an energy distribution plan that maximizes efficiency through carefully analyzing regional synergies, and truly targeting the poor through affordable and universal energy supplies;⁹
- A partnership with donors to secure resources from carbon funds to retire polluting energy sources where practical and undertake investment in environmentally sustainable, clean fuels where possible;
- Implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); and

⁹ Investment in energy distribution reforms now will only yield results over the medium-term- seven to ten years- and therefore Kosovo needs to enter into medium-term purchase agreements as soon as possible to ensure predictable power supply in the interim.

- A partnership with the Export-Import Bank in the US and other similar bodies elsewhere which have experience in assisting developing countries develop their natural resources to further understand how Kosovo's assets can be put to best use.

Beyond energy, TA funding could also support:

- The creation of a single fund for feasibility studies that can produce a stock of reports which outline the clear costs and benefits of different investment options and consolidate feasibility studies carried out to date to allow coherent planning; and
- An in-depth and clear assessment of regional transport synergies and alternative development options in the transport sector, linked to planning for a program of public works (see below).

At present, there is no sense of how TA could be redirected strategically because donor contractors have not allowed this thinking to develop. Only when strategic planning and prioritization becomes independent from these actors can TA truly be reconfigured in ways that will support Kosovo's development priorities. This will include ensuring that any TA has proven ability, clear deliverables, reporting arrangements to a specified Kosovar counter-part who has- either individually or as part of a committee- ability to assess and if necessary terminate the contract of that consultant- incentives for knowledge transfer.

iii) Improving coordination with donors

The government Donor Coordination Center (DCC) has had difficulty creating traction as donors seem unaware that the DCC is the point of contact on coordination issues- as a result the DCC has authority, but no power. The DCC does not itself have the ability to coordinate donors (nor does the UN system which by definition is in competition with the government for funds), but it can become the catalyst for doing so if it acts as a coordination mechanism for the creation of a unified message on Kosovo's development priorities. Based on this, the government must seek to present to donors a realistic process for transformation that donors feel they can support.

For their part, donors must explain clearly to their Kosovar counterparts whether making a different case would have different results in terms of commitments to Kosovo. They must also provide realistic funding ceilings and explain the rationale of their delivery modalities. Coalitions then need to be built around these funding modalities. Donors should limit the number of sectors in which they operate and seek to move towards programmatic budgeting to reduce the number of small projects they support and improve prospects for coordination. Ideally, each will focus on only two or three sectors and should be encouraged to map their flexibility and constraints to identify exactly where they can come together (eg. some donors may be willing to provide programmatic support, others may not). Government, donors and NGOs could collaborate to define civil society as distinct from NGOs, and put in place clear regulatory arrangements to ensure transparency and accountability in use of NGO funds. An NGO budget for all NGO activity could be considered, which would bring greater transparency and ability to plan and coordinate to activities.

iv) Creating a program for human development

There has been no systematic investment in tertiary education to allow Kosovars to aspire to European standards and no investment in vocational training to create skills for the private, public and voluntary sectors. The government must work with donors to develop a long-term human development strategy that can create the human capital necessary to staff, lead and manage Kosovo's development. This might include:

- A program, designed and paid for by the government, for the creation of a cadre of 'fast-track' public sector professionals recruited through an open, fair process. This group will be placed in key positions

within government and will be legally protected from political interference in their professional duties;

- Exploration of partnerships with the best universities in the region and the world to produce a well-educated, multi-ethnic skills base among Kosovo's young people to create a long-term, sustainable economy; and
- Skills-building and training in areas such as engineering, to produce a domestic contracting industry and allow Kosovo to exit from its dependency on aid. Such a program might also include training for Kosovars seeking to emigrate to Europe and elsewhere, to improve their employment prospects and therefore their capacity to send finances home and support Kosovo's development upon their return.

v) *Public works programs at the village level*

A series of innovative public works programs at the village level directed towards market access will also support economic growth and job creation. The Ahtisaari plan calls for further decentralization, which requires building accountability and participation from the bottom up in order to support delegation of decision-making from the top down. Public works programs at the village level should therefore be designed in a way that allows citizens to set priorities and monitor the quality of implementation to improve efficiency in municipal capital expenditures. As the absence of infrastructure is a particular problem in remote areas, there should be an emphasis on small and medium scale projects specifically designed to support private sector development and the emergence of local industry. These programs can be designed so as to function as redistributive mechanism to support social peace and cohesion and dissipate frustration at lack of participation at the local level. These types of programs are also a mechanism through which to demonstrate the capacity for effective expenditure to donors in support of further financial aid.

vi) *Creating a multi-ethnic society*

The Ahtisaari plan requires binding obligations on moving the idea of a multi-ethnic Kosovo society and polity into the realm of feasibility. As areas north of the Ibar river are going to be the critical testing ground of the idea, urgent attention to the problems of daily life in these municipalities can be the mechanism for signalling of PISG and international commitment to the realization of a multi-ethnic state. Northern Mitrovica is the only area of Kosovo that has the visible signs of a place still in-conflict. As a significant number of daily problems can only be addressed by focusing on the common constraints of northern and southern municipalities, early and systematic focus on these issues can provide visible momentum towards the goal of a multi-ethnic state of Kosovo.

VIII. Longer-term Critical Tasks

vii) *Mobilizing resources and capabilities*

The government in Kosovo understands the importance of the economy as a driver of stability and must now bring together resources and capabilities and make a commitment to the creation of credible and fair mechanisms for expanded wealth creation. This will in turn allow for sustainable development and create avenues for the productive use of Kosovar and international capital. To do this, the government must agree on and enforce norms and standards across many of the issues and sectors discussed above, such as infrastructure, the rule of law and human investment. It must also develop a coherent private sector-led competitiveness strategy that can create real jobs and truly produce clusters of growth based on Kosovo's competitive advantages and commercial integration with regional partners. Energy reform is the key priority in the near-term to improve competitiveness, and TA can be redirected to help in this regard. As previously outlined, donors have a range of tools that the PISG could leverage to improve market-based outcomes, ranging from risk guarantees and insurance to preferential market access.

Kosovo has laid the basis for a competitive economy in the European context. For example: a significant housing stock has been developed; the basis for a service and tourist industry exists; wine production is taking off; and the construction and jewelry industries have potential, but Kosovo must think through the European market and identify where the comparative advantage lies, and decide how Kosovars can take best advantage of it. Kosovar businesses must create value-chains- from production, to processing, to distribution, to marketing- and brand Kosovo across these value chains. Businesses must also carry out supply chain analysis to ensure the predictability and availability, at consistent prices, of the goods necessary to add value to their outputs. This will allow capital to flow and the economy to grow.

viii) Bringing coherence to rules and law

Politics must become citizen-oriented, using the rule of law as a mechanism to create trust. Rules can be resources but also constraints if there is confusion about the formal and informal nature of those rules. Nodes of formal decision-making in Kosovo do not correspond with actual nodes of power, the degree of predictability in decision-making is low and institutions are captured rather than used. Rule making is therefore hidden within a web of confusion and the desire among ordinary Kosovars for clarity of this process is very high. To rectify this issue, rule through law, without adherence by elites to the law itself, must be replaced with predictable rule-bound behavior by decision-makers. Also, the government must again make a concerted effort to align rules with European legislation. Efforts in this regard, ideally supported as far as possible by the EU, will allow for coherence of rules and law and create trust in government through allowing transparency of rule-making procedures.

ix) Building social cohesion for all Kosovars

Social cohesion can be built in Kosovo through providing Kosovars with decision-making powers in an accountable fashion and transforming this decision-making from an individual to a collective process among and between Kosovar Serb and Albanian communities. It cannot just be shared problems that bring these different ethnic groups together, but shared solutions. This means developing programs that connect citizens with local authorities through transferring decision rights and financial resources to communities on a sustainable basis to support a credible process of co-production. Public works programs, as described above, are one example of the way in which this sort of dynamic might play itself out in Kosovo and ensure support for other difficult reforms by acting as a social insurance policy for stability.

Social cohesion will also stem from investment in infrastructure that can connect communities and rectify the serious problems with water and electricity supply and health and social service delivery. These problems affect Kosovars on a daily basis and erode trust and confidence in the viability of a unified, multi-ethnic Kosovo. Reform of management from top down in government is also critical. This involves a wide array of reform across the political, legal and governance domains, but can begin with small, achievable steps such as a concerted decision to increase wages for civil servants to stem the brain drain from government; installation of information management systems to harmonize flows of information across government; or development of an iris recognition system to ensure civil service numbers are monitored effectively.

IX. Recommendations

i) Movement from improvisation to strategy

Development in Kosovo has suffered from lack of detailed and coherent planning- short-term concerns have overwhelmed longer-term considerations. Improvisation has prevented coordination between the different levels of government, and as a result a vacuum has developed that has been filled by patronage and corruption. This gap between authority and the citizenry has prevented regeneration of the social

contract, the development of a coherent vision for the polity and economy, or the emergence of a future that Kosovars can believe in. Accountability has been compromised by the dual power structure brought about by international administration, and each level of the government and international community has blamed each other for collective failures.

Now, there is a destination and consensus on core European values, but no strategy to get there. The government must begin the process of developing such a strategy, in collaboration with donors, by moving from improvisation to choreography of reform. The processes for the change to the post-status political and economic environment must be synchronized, and sequencing of this reform is critical. If larger goals can be broken down into more manageable building blocks, this will allow the government to indicate progress and build momentum. Policymakers should highlight two or three key reforms to be made each year in critical sectors- any more than this is unfeasible given political and capacity constraints- and focus on pushing through these reforms, explaining the payoffs and realistically assessing and sequencing the risks. The timing and speed of these changes should be decided by the government- quick reform is not always most beneficial- the key issue is that changes made align Kosovo with its European goal.

ii) *Expectations must be managed*

Stability in Kosovo depends upon management of the expectations of the population in the pre- and post-status period. Status per se will not solve Kosovo's problems, but grandstanding by politicians and miscommunication by the government has led much of the population to believe otherwise. Therefore plans must be put in place now to ensure that the social and economic preconditions begin to develop to support positive change post-status to ensure hopes are set at reasonable levels, and to prevent huge dissatisfaction with the harsh post-status reality. Kosovo has made impressive reforms in the past nine years, but continued momentum will only be possible if concerted signals are sent by the government to ordinary Kosovars on what further goals can realistically be met and the actions that fiscal constraints will allow. Process in an age of instant and constant communication is not a luxury, but a necessity within citizen-centered politics. Although politically difficult, the elite in Kosovo must come together to communicate now that the government does not have the capacity to generate immediate and significant improvements in employment and living standards as soon as the status issue is resolved.

iii) *The ICO and donors must become a catalyst for the double transformation.*

Kosovo must now pass through a simultaneous transition- from a protectorate to a state, and to a situation of shared sovereignty in Europe. This transition is both unique and extremely difficult. The responsibility for governing Kosovo after a status resolution will provide a fillip for reform and prevent the Kosovo government from hiding behind unclear lines of accountability as it has tended to do under UNMIK. At the same time, however, the EU-led successor mission must be careful to ensure that it plays the role of facilitator rather than an administrator in post-status Kosovo. Although it will retain key executive powers in some areas, extensive devolution of governmental powers to the Kosovo government must occur in an organized fashion. The ICO must plan for contingencies carefully to ensure that the international community does not retain more decision-making powers than currently anticipated due to unplanned exigencies. Further, it must again ensure that all provisions and legislation adhere to European standards and rules, as a Bosnia type situation in which institutions are created but then need to be rebuilt to adhere to European stipulations, must be avoided at all costs.

iv) *Preparation of the partners' conference requires co-production.*

The donor conference will be a critical tool to convince the rest of the world that Kosovo has made the necessary fiduciary and public financial management reforms and can spend donor commitments in an accountable and transparent way. The Kosovo Development Strategy and Plan and the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework processes were useful, but must now come to a close. The PISG should work with donors, through a method of co-production, on a series of proposals for taking this work forward and

agree on preparation for a donor's conference in spring 2008. This necessitates consensus on the key components of the vision for Kosovo, the cooperative mechanisms necessary to bring about change and the resource envelope for implementation of reforms. The donor conference must be a celebration of cooperation, and a forum for international commitment to Kosovo, not the scene for debate or discussion about modalities or reform. Preparation for the partners' conference will take six months of sustained attention and organization to ensure coordination and success, and thus planning must begin immediately.

X. Conclusion

This is a difficult and pivotal period of Kosovo's history, but the problems it faces are not insurmountable and significant assets exist to provide the basis for a secure and prosperous future. Strong social networks, incipient civil society, the foundations of a national accountability system and plentiful latent assets can be mobilized intelligently, and a status decision will make inhabitants of Kosovo citizens, which will in turn allow for the systematic removal of many blockages that have prevented development in the territory. However, the requisite planning and preparation for the post-status period simply has not been carried out and Kosovar institutions remain woefully short of capacity, legitimacy and trust. This is in part a result of weak social cohesion, rule of law, governance and market mechanisms, and a lack of investment in capabilities, but is also the result of a lack of coordination among donors and a reliance on technical assistance which has stymied Kosovar capacity growth and diverted priorities.

Reform must begin with a sober and accurate appreciation of the costs of status and recognition of the fact that the international community has a far greater range of assets that Kosovo can use to build a functioning market, stimulate investment and expand the zone of legitimate economic activity. In the medium-term, Kosovo must consolidate accountability gains within government institutions, reform technical assistance delivery, improve coordination within and between donors, create a coherent program for human development and plan public works programs at the village level. In the longer-term, the government must mobilize resources and capabilities towards the European goal, generate coherence between rules and law, and build social cohesion for a united Kosovo. As Kosovo seeks to navigate the double transition from protectorate to state and Europe, movement must take place from improvisation to strategy to bring together needs and their solutions through longer-term planning. The international community can help this process by ensuring that it facilitates rather than administers change in Kosovo, and assists the Kosovar leadership in preparing for the post-status partners' conference.

Kosovo exists within Europe geographically, and belongs in Europe economically and politically. Therefore, Europe must become the vision for the future behind which all Kosovars come together and upon which they base all decision-making. The rules provided by the European Union will allow a framework to develop through which mechanisms for achieving this vision can be brought about and consensus forged. The onus is on the Kosovar Serbs and Albanians to make the difficult decisions necessary and initiate the change imperative to create a unified, prosperous and stable Kosovo. In the words of one Kosovar in Prizren, movement from zero to one is much more difficult than the movement from one to one thousand. Kosovo has moved from zero to one, and despite the challenges it faces, there is a real sense of optimism and resilience among the Kosovar people. If channeled in the right ways and through the correct mechanisms, these sentiments and the progress made to date can be consolidated and multiplied to transform the territory into a prosperous and secure member of a Europe in which it belongs.

Annex I- List of Persons met in Kosovo, September 2nd-13th, 2007:

Unity Team:

Agim Ceku, Prime Minister of Kosovo
Fatmir Sejdiu, President of Kosovo
Veton Surroi, Head of ORA
Hashim Thaqi, President of the PDK
Kole Berisha, President of the Assembly

Political Party Representatives:

Ahmet Isufi, AAK Vice-President
Naim Maloku, Member of Parliament

Provisional Institutions of Self-Government:

Ethem Ceku, Minister of Energy and Mining
Haki Shatri, Minister of Economy and Finance
Kole Berisha, President of the Assembly
Rexhep Haxhimusa, Head of Supreme Court
Ismet Hashani, Mayor of Obiliq
Agim Krasniqi, Budget Director, Budget Department, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Rozeta Hajdari, Head of the Donor Coordination Center
Jacob Ulrich, Senior Advisor, Donor Coordination Center
Hajdar Korbi, Head of the Macro Unit, Ministry of Finance
Arianit Blakaj, Macro Unit, Ministry of Finance
Valmira Rexhebeqaj, Macro Unit, Ministry of Finance
Semra Tyrbedari, Macro Unit, Ministry of Finance
Peter Thurlow, Macro Unit, Ministry of Finance
Isa Mustafa, Advisor to the President
Vjosa Osmani, Advisor to the President
Fatime Qosaj Arenliu, Chief of Health Policy and Planning Division
Dr. Shyqri Kelmendi, Senior Political Advisor, Ministry of Energy and Mining

Business Community:

Xhemajl Recica, Coordinator, Poultry Association of Kosovo
Dr. Kurtesh Sherifi, Executive Director, Kosovo Association of Milk Producers
Alliance of Kosovar Businesses, AKB
Alliance of Kosovar Agribusinesses, AKA
Flavour Miller Association, SHMK

Civil Society:

Haki Abazi, Program Officer, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Shpend Ahmeti, Director, Policy Analysis Group
Rreze Duli, Director of ATRC
Visar Hoti, Director, TEMA
Beni Qena, Editor, RTK
Tina Grazhdani, Director, East West Management Institute- Kosovo
Jeta Xharra, Director, Balkan Investigative Research Network (BIRN)
Florent Vranica, Head of Office, Catholic Relief Services
Ana Kostic, Department of Culture
Ardita Zejnullahu, Director, Association of Broadcasters
Sazan Ibrahimimi, Executive Director, Association of Kosovo Municipalities
Jehona Lushaku, Director of International Relations, University of Prishtina
Students from the University of Prishtina
Students from the American University of Kosovo
Stakeholder groups in Kline, Prizren, Shtrpce, Manastirc, Palaj, Drenica and north Mitrovica.
Anti-trafficking advocacy group, led by the Catholic Relief Services and ATRC

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK):

Joachim Rucker, Special Representative of the Secretary General
Chiara Bronchi, Head, Fiscal Affairs Office

International Community:

Hykmete Bajrami, National Programme Officer, Swedish Liaison Office
David Blunt, British Office, Head of Mission
Renzo Daviddi, EC office in Kosovo
Ervor Edman, Senior Programme Officer, Swedish Liaison Office
Michael Farbman, USAID representative office in Kosovo
Cristina S. Hammond, Project Director, Kosovo-Dartmouth Alliance for Healthy Newborns
Cpt. Peter Hernandez, Aide de Camp to the Commanding General, KFOR
Zachary Hubbell, Senior field manager, USAID, Kosovo Cluster and Business Support Project

Tina Kaidanow, USOP, Chief of Mission
Karen McDonald, Deputy Head of Swedish Liaison Office
Fatos Mulla, National Programme Officer, Swedish Liaison Office
Ranjit Nayak, World Bank representative in Kosovo
Ann-Sofie Nilsson, Head of Swedish Liaison Office
Ruairi O'Connell, British Office, Deputy Head of Mission
Edgardo Ruggiero, IMF representative in Kosovo
Jeff Tudor, Head of DFID office in Kosovo
Emile van der Does de Willebois, Financial Marketing Integrity, World Bank

